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Interpreting Liberty and Equality
Through the Lens of Marriage
Nan D. Hunter*
Would a master painting be worth as much if it were mounted inside a
cheap and ugly frame? Of course—one would simply replace the frame with
one that matched the artistic sensibility and value of the painting. What if it
was not the frame that demeaned the visual aesthetic but a lens that distorted
the artist’s work? Imagine that this lens was affixed to the painting, so that one
could view the painting only through the lens. This possibility is more
troubling. If the lens is permanent, the painting would no longer be worth as
much because the distortion caused by the lens would have altered the meaning
and experience of the painting.
Reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges1
left me with a similar queasy feeling about the right of same sex couples to
marry.2 The opinion repeatedly emphasizes those aspects of marriage that are
both the most idealized and the most constraining. The opinion’s discussion of
marriage moves far beyond a right to gain access to an important government
structure for recognition and benefits, to the point of invoking the fear that
without marriage, one will be “condemned to live in loneliness.”3 Is marriage
equality the frame for an important step forward at least for formal equality
under the law or has the Supreme Court’s decision bowdlerized the message of
equality with its distorting lens? If, as is most likely, the answer is both, how
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1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id. at 2605.
3. Id. at 2608.
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difficult will this lens be to dislodge and for how long? I argue in this Essay
that Obergefell elevates traditionalist concepts of marriage over principles of
liberty or equality. It reproduces a jurisprudence that frames access to a statecreated status, which should be open to all, as a reward for adherence to a
narrow social meaning of marriage. Using the power of law and invoking
liberty and equality, the Court forces open an exclusionary institution, but as a
cultural message of support for greater human freedom, the opinion seems
conflicted. Moreover, at the level of doctrine, it generates greater uncertainty
for other courts in applying equal protection analysis and dealing with intimate
relationships outside marriage.
The freedom to marry for same-sex couples has always drawn criticism
from opposite political poles as either too conservative in its ambitions or too
destabilizing in its consequences. There is nothing new here. A right to equal
treatment often grows from an outsider’s claim to participate in a
fundamentally assimilationist institution, as is demonstrated by the history of
challenges to exclusion from practices associated with citizenship, whether
public education or military service. Voting is so prosaic that half of Americans
who could vote regularly do not,4 yet the rights of African-Americans and
women to vote were once radical claims; suffrage for women is still less than
100 years old. And although voting is insufficient to secure full social
citizenship and economic participation, it is nonetheless necessary. One hopes
that we will one day say the same about sexual citizenship, that achieving equal
access to marriage was a necessary step to a deeper understanding of sexuality
as a human right and a central component of human flourishing. If, as the Court
says, marriage is “the keystone of our social order,”5 then further disconnecting
it from mechanisms of subordination would be something to celebrate.
Yet seldom has the theme of joining rather than challenging an institution
been as central as it was in the same-sex marriage campaign.6 This theme
provided Justice Kennedy with the linchpin of his opinion: “[I]t is the enduring
importance of marriage that is their whole point. [Plaintiffs are motivated by]
their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities.”7 The tone
sounds vaguely apologetic, and one imagines Justice Kennedy in conversation
with fellow conservatives, seeking to downplay and justify the result. He surely
4. Thom File, Who Votes? Congressional Elections and the American Electorate: 19782014, U.S. Census (July 2015) at 3 (Table 1) (available at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [http://perma.cc/VPM2-63N9]).
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2601.
6. See generally FREEDOM TO MARRY, MOVING MARRIAGE FORWARD: BUILDING
MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE 6 (2011) (“[G]ay couples want to join marriage not ‘change’
it . . . because they respect the institution and what it means in our society, and because they believe in
the values of marriage and what it can bring: commitment, happiness, responsibility, companionship,
family connectedness, and support and help in caring for those we love.”),
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/page/-/files/pdfs/Moving%20Marriage%20Forward.pdf
[http://www.perma.cc/53ZR-B5EG].
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
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has the discretion to write in this register, and doing so may be strategically
adept. But as political philosophy, the opinion is scattershot at best. It swerves
between the classically liberal concept of self-determination, a gesture toward
Rawlsian justice,8 and a neoliberal commitment to privatizing the risk of
material insecurity through the mechanism of expanding private, family-based
responsibility.
I.
THE ROLE OF DIGNITY
Obergefell’s center of gravity is the concept of dignity. The Court
catalogs the ways in which same-sex couples measure up to the ideals of
“nobility and dignity”9 embodied in the institution of marriage. Not only are
LGBT Americans as devoted to partners and children as heterosexuals, but we
also “aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its
highest meaning.”10 Exactly what these lofty phrases mean is anyone’s guess. It
certainly sounds, though, that, like the deserving poor, the deserving queer
have earned this recognition by pledging allegiance to a particular cultural flag
and the norms for which it stands.
Where does that leave the presumptively un-deserving (poor or queer or
both)? The Court in Obergefell reasons that marriage serves the same functions
for lesbian and gay couples as for different-sex couples, and inequality in
access to marriage is wrong. Does the case also stand for the proposition that
inequality is wrong because we are equally worthy of access? The opinion
creates a disturbing sense of contingency, the implication that the dignity rights
at issue flow less from the bedrock of human rights than from the respectability
of both the particular institution and the particular plaintiffs whose moral worth
render them eligible to participate in it. Dignity is a slippery concept, and it is
too soon to know whether it will figure significantly in U.S. constitutional
law.11 It is instructive, however, to compare the use of “dignity” in Obergefell
and Windsor, an earlier Justice Kennedy decision concerning federal
recognition of same-sex marriage,12 to the role dignity plays in the law of other
nations where the right is explicitly found in constitutional text. In the same8. John Rawls conceived of justice as the maximization of both liberty and equality,
exemplified by principles flowing from “the veil of ignorance,” in which the test of justice would be
whether an individual would agree to be governed by a given policy without knowing her position in
society. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–19 (rev. ed. 1999). See also, Leif Wenar, “John
Rawls”, Para. 4, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.),
(available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#JusFaiJusWitLibSoc
[http://perma.cc/NSM5-HUUG]).
9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2594.
10. Id. at 2602.
11. For a comparative analysis, see Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere:
Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 331 (2012).
12. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 2692, 2694, 2696 (2013).
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sex marriage decision from the Constitutional Court of South Africa,13 for
example, dignity is intrinsic to the person and all family forms. In the view of
that court, the state does not confer dignity by granting marriage rights; rather it
is compelled to recognize the strong link between dignity and equality.14
In Obergefell, marriage and dignity are fused, and marital dignity
functions as a mediating institution. The bonds of marriage enable “two
persons together [to] find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and
spirituality.”15 There is an “abiding connection between marriage and
liberty,”16 and marriage appears to ennoble this liberty. It is a “two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”17 The
opinion leaves no doubt that this is a quid pro quo: “[J]ust as a couple vows to
support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple.”18
In fairness to the Justices, they were struggling with how to analyze an
institution of densely packed social meaning. Perhaps one reason for the
overblown language of the opinion is an impulse to deflect attention from the
historical association of marriage not only with commitment and children, but
also with sexuality. The words “dignity” and “sexuality” do not usually appear
in the same sentence. Consciously or not, the Court uses the language of
dignity in ways that occlude the physical intimacy dimensions of what is at
stake, even though, until relatively recently, marriage was the only social
location in which sexual activity was lawful. An alternative concept of dignity
more infused with democratic and pluralist values could encompass respect for
variation in kinship, sexuality, and affiliation. The moralistic version of dignity
in Obergefell does not.
Yet, norms of sexual practice will remain dynamic despite the extent to
which they are hidden or legitimized by marriage. When sex was legal only
between spouses and marriage was coterminous with heterosexuality, any and
all of the sexual practices of same-sex partners were intrinsically transgressive.
Acquiring the option to marry will not eliminate extra-marital liaisons by samesex partners any more than it has for different-sex couples. Indeed, there is
evidence that the custom of multiple partners is especially common among
male couples.19 In sexual liberty terms, what same-sex couples have acquired is

13. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19.
14. Id. at para. 78, 79.
15. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2601.
19. Colleen C. Hoff et al., Relationship Characteristics Associated with Sexual Risk Behavior
Among MSM in Committed Relationships, 26 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDS 738, 741 (2012)
(reporting that 55 percent of the 566 gay male couples studied had agreed to an open relationship);
Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions Than
Answers, 100 GEO. L. J. 1855, 1867 (2012).
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the option that heterosexual couples have long had: to act as if sexuality is
contained within marriage.
Most people would consider the implicit agreement to participate in the
performance of monogamy as discursive theater—a representation which could
be accurate or not, at any given time, for any given couple—as a small price to
pay for equality under law. Some LGBT rights advocates prioritized equal
marriage rights in part because the extraordinary degree of resistance to their
arguments seemed to signal that if gays and lesbians were found equal for
purposes of this institution, then eliminating other barriers to equality would
seem like a mop-up operation. Admittedly, it might take a few years to iron out
all the wrinkles in the fabric of equality, but there would be no doubt as to the
outcome. The degree of judgmentalism in the opinion, however, illuminates
serious flaws in the proposition that equal marriage will raise all boats.
II.
A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY?
The Obergefell Court concludes that same-sex partners who wish to marry
are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.”20 But the logic of the
opinion raises the obvious question of how much dignity should attach to
individuals who choose not to marry. The Court describes an individual’s
choices regarding marriage as central to autonomy because they “shape an
individual’s destiny.”21 A right to marry that is so central to personhood must
entail a commensurate right not to marry. Every important liberty is a Januslike construct: absent extraordinary and urgent conditions, there are always two
equal sides. One has the liberty to speak or not to speak. One has the right to
bear or beget a child, or not. Americans can travel at will, but cannot be
forcibly relocated. So too, not-marriage as a negative liberty right must be
fundamental.
Less clear is the fate of policies that affirmatively advantage or favor
married persons over the unmarried. In demographic terms, not-marriage is
growing in significance as both a status, whether temporary or permanent, and
a choice. Of Americans aged 25 to 44, almost a third are either single or
divorced.22 There are two dimensions to the right not to marry. Not-marriage
(like marriage) may coincide with sexual practices that implicate questions of
constitutional protection for conduct.23 In addition and independently of the
question of conduct, constitutional questions arise concerning protection for
20. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
21. Id.. at 2599.
22. See Hunter, supra note 19, at 1860 (“Of American women in the prime marrying ages of
twenty-five to forty-four, more than 40% were either divorced (13%), cohabiting (11%), or single
(18%).”).
23. See infra notes 40–42; see also Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the history of marriage and how the institution serves as “a vehicle of stateimposed sexual discipline”).
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unmarried status. Individuals who could have married but chose not to may
challenge the validity of government policies that favor similarly situated
persons who chose to marry. Ironically, their grounds for doing so may be
stronger after Obergefell.
III.
UNRESOLVED CHALLENGES POST-OBERGEFELL
Having won the right to marry, the LGBT rights movement will face the
same question as other social justice movements: Is formal equality or liberty
enough? The question today for the LGBT rights movement is how it will
deploy the resources that it mobilized for marriage equality. One option is that
organizations will continue to prioritize other formal equality goals, such as
enactment of federal and state laws that explicitly prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination. Protection from discrimination in the ordinary transactions of
daily life—on the job, in housing or in public accommodations—is surely
important. Equally important, however, are issues that arise from the bottom up
and have a disproportionate impact on less advantaged portions of the LGBT
population.
For economically marginal groups within the LGBT community, the daily
operations of law enforcement agencies continue to re-inscribe subordination.
A study by the Center for Gender and Sexuality Studies at Columbia Law
School reported that 73 percent of a sample of LGBT people and people living
with HIV had face-to-face contact with police during a five-year period.24 Of
that group, five percent had been incarcerated, compared to three percent of the
U.S. adult population.25 One reason, the report argued, is that “transgender
women of color and LGBT youth of color are endemically profiled as being
engaged in sex work, public lewdness, or other sexual offenses.”26 Other
studies also document a disproportionate association between race, gender
identity, or sexual orientation, and police harassment, especially in the context
of sex work.27

24. CATHERINE HANSSENS ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE: FEDERAL POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE AND PEOPLE
LIVING WITH HIV 4 (2014), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gendersexuality/files/roadmap_for_change_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/NGL8-53J9].
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Elijah Adiv Edelman, “This Area Has Been Declared a Prostitution Free Zone”:
Discursive Formations of Space, the State, and Trans “Sex Worker” Bodies, 58 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
848 (2011); Lydia A. Sausa et al., Perceived Risks and Benefits of Sex Work Among Transgender
Women of Color in San Francisco, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 768 (2007).
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IV.
HOW STRONG THE EQUALITY?
In addition to the strategic questions related to movement priorities, two
major questions of law remain unsettled. For all its rhetorical fireworks,
Obergefell does little to clarify the scope of either the liberty or equality
principles on which it is based. The right to marry is a classic equal liberty
claim, a hybrid of the fundamental right to marry and the exclusion of a class of
couples in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In the closest analogous
case, Loving v. Virginia,28 the Court struck down a state ban on interracial
marriage in an opinion much more heavily grounded in an Equal Protection
analysis than Obergefell. Loving contains two short paragraphs on liberty,
treating it as almost an afterthought, a brief recognition that the parties, whose
primary claim rested in the Equal Protection Clause, also had a liberty-based
right to marry.29 Plaintiffs’ lawyers in Obergefell had hoped to win a similar
Equal Protection victory, ideally organized along the principles of heightened
scrutiny.
The Court chose a different path in Obergefell, however. It recognized
both liberty and equality grounds for its holding, but the equality portion of the
analysis reads as the weaker of the two. Equality is not so obviously the
tagalong in Obergefell that liberty was in Loving, but its scope is unclear.
Throughout its discussion of equal protection, Obergefell references the
equality issue nested within a right to liberty, stating for example that “[i]t was
the essential nature of the marriage right [in Zablocki v. Redhail30] that made
apparent the law’s incompatibility with requirements of equality.”31 But how
strong will the Court’s commitment to equality be when there is no
fundamental liberty involved to make apparent the inequality of a sexual
orientation classification? The Court does not answer that question.
Remarkably, the section of the opinion addressing equality contains no citation
to Romer v. Evans, the only Supreme Court case involving LGBT persons that
was squarely decided on Equal Protection grounds.32 Nor is there any
discussion of the tiers of review that have traditionally been necessary to an
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
The absence of tiers may simply signal the declining use of an overly
mechanistic structure in a calculus that would more appropriately turn on
questions related to proportionality. Identifying whether a law imposes a
burden that is disproportionate to its likely benefit would offer a more sensible
28. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. Id. at 12.
30. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
31. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
32. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). But cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)
(“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty . . . protected by the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003) (declining to declare the
Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).
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approach than remaining stuck in the criteria for heightened scrutiny. The
underlying principle that greater burdens require more persuasive justifications
provides one of the anchors of constitutional jurisprudence.33 Review of
classifications that are odious but have not been found suspect provides an
obvious opportunity for the Court to expand on its use of this principle.
Instead, the opinion lacks a meaningful equal protection analysis despite
its holding that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated. This omission
will produce uncertainty. We know from the context of reproductive rights that
while the state cannot block the exercise of a fundamental right, it can engage
in negative action, such as condemnation, to discourage it. Since Maher v.
Roe,34 the Supreme Court has imposed “no limitation on the authority of a State
to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”35 The same principle could
apply to sexual orientation issues. For example, Alabama requires that public
school sex education curricula “emphasize . . . that homosexuality is not a
lifestyle acceptable to the general public.”36 There is no liberty right to nonpejorative or even accurate schoolbooks, and one can imagine that some state
legislatures or school boards might cling to the message that homosexuality is
immoral, even if same-sex couples can marry. The gaps in the equal protection
analysis in Obergefell may allow states to continue adopting policies that
attempt to shame lesbians and gay men who exercise their right to marry.
V.
HOW CAPACIOUS THE LIBERTY?
The second unanswered doctrinal question is how far the liberty right will
extend to protect intimate relationships other than marriage. Put another way,
what is the scope of liberty for couples gay or straight who could marry but
choose not to and for those in intimate relationships that involve more than two
persons? The Constitutional Court of South Africa joined the right of same-sex
couples to marry with a “right to be different,” noting “South Africa has a
multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the only
socially and legally acceptable one.”37
In the United States, there is well-established doctrine, though relatively
little case law, on a right to intimate association that is exemplified by familial,
33. In the realm of equal protection, for example, the Court has developed a concept of
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved” in
assessing whether Congress has exceeded its authority in enacting remedial legislation. The State must
demonstrate a compelling government interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of
furthering its interest. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997).
34. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
35. Id. at 474.
36. ALA. CODE 1975 § 16-40A-2(c)(8).
37. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19, at para. 59.
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but not necessarily marriage-based, relationships.38 The Supreme Court has
described the prototype of intimate association as relationships that involve
“deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”39 Cases
brought on this ground have often involved plaintiffs who were fired from
public sector jobs, frequently in law enforcement, for beginning romantic
relationships with co-workers or offenders in violation of agency policies.40 It
is unclear how the liberty right recognized in Obergefell will interact with
government policies that ban or impose penalties for intimate associations in
workplace or other settings.
Additional challenges to laws that restrict liberty within the zone of
intimate association seem inevitable. Recently, fundamentalist Mormons in
Utah brought a case, now pending in the Tenth Circuit, to assert that they
engage in “religious cohabitation” in violation of a statute that prohibits
cohabitation as well as polygamy.41 Plaintiffs in this case are not challenging
the validity of the prohibition on bigamy, but claim a right to live as they wish
so long as they do not seek the recognition of marriage. The district court found
no fundamental right to religious cohabitation, but struck down the statute
under rational basis review as a restriction on liberty in light of Lawrence, in
part because the State did not prosecute persons for adultery or “religiously
motivated polygamy.”42

38. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (“[T]he relationships that might be
entitled to . . . constitutional protection are those that . . . attend the creation and sustenance of a
family.”).
39. Id. at 620.
40. See, e.g., Bautista v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 4th 869 (2010) (alleging that
termination for engaging in a personal relationship with a prostitute violated plaintiff’s right to
freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Isenbart v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, No. 11-cv-03240-LTB-BNB, 2012 WL 4378269 (D. Col. Sept. 25, 2012) (alleging
termination as a result of entering into an “intimate dating, marital, and familial relationship” with
another county employee); Via v. Taylor, 224 F. Supp. 2d 753 (D. Del. 2002) (alleging wrongful
termination resulting from correctional officer’s off-duty relationship with paroled former inmate);
Cross v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 213 Md. App. 294 (2013) (arguing that plaintiff was terminated
in violation of her constitutional right to marry and to engage in intimate association); Briggs v. N.
Muskegon Police Dep’t, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aff’d without opinion, 746 F.2d 1475
(6th Cir. 1984) (alleging that plaintiff was dismissed from his job as a part-time city police officer for
cohabiting with a married woman who was not his wife); Corso v. Fisher, 983 F. Supp. 2d 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging that New York City’s Department of Corrections policy prohibiting
personal association of agency employees with current and former inmates and their associates
violated the First Amendment). Other cases involve firing a public employee based on a spouse’s
actions. Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (alleging his discharge in retaliation for lawsuit
filed by wife violated his First Amendment rights); Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New
York, 107 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1997) (challenging local law on grounds that it unconstitutionally
infringed on right of association).
41. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178, 1181 (D. Utah 2013) (appeal pending).
42. Id. at 1224.
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CONCLUSION
One lesson from Obergefell is clear: those who thought that a ruling on
same-sex marriage would be the final word from the Supreme Court on the
limits of state regulation of sexuality must reconsider. There is surely more to
come and more that needs to be done, especially on behalf of those whose
sexual practices or intimate relationships fall outside the penumbra of
respectability that Obergefell celebrates. “The nature of injustice is such that
we may not always see it in our own times.”43

43.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).

